Vantablack |
Today The 1709 Blog is delighted to host a guest contribution by Divya Mirlay (Christ College, Bangalore) on the
specific copyright implications surrounding Vantablack.
Here's what Divya writes:
"Oscar
Wilde in his inimitable fashion once said, “mere color, unspoiled by meaning,
and unallied with definite form, can speak to the soul in a thousand different
ways.” Ironically, Wilde’s eloquent description of color resonates with the
British art maestro Anish Kapoor’s description of the complete absence of
color, which goes by the name Vantablack.
A unique
material composed of millions of incredibly small nanotubes grown on a metal
surface, Vantablack is recognized by the Guiness World Records as the World’s Darkest man-made substance. In an interview, Mr Kapoor describes the unique qualities of Vantablack’s use in art
and the powerful responses it evokes.
This
unique material has recently surfaced in the context of a potential copyright row. According to Surrey NanoSystems, a
British company that developed the material, Mr. Kapoor alone possesses the
exclusive license to use Vantanblack in artistic creations.
Appalled by the apparent monopolization of a
colour, several in the creative world have vehemently opposed it.
The protection afforded to colours under the intellectual property regime has
been hoarsely advocated by several MNCs in the past- be it Cadbury’s purple or T-Mobile’s
magenta.
The
exclusive ownership of colours by individuals, particularly in the context of
artistic works, though rare, is not unheard of. What is still in a state of flux
however, is the copyright protection of colour.
The man that ‘bought’ blue
The
oft-touted precedent for the ownership of color is that of International Klein
Blue (IKB), a hue mixed by the French artist Yves Klein in 1960. IKB was developed by suspending dry pigments in synthetic resins, resulting in the
individual particles of the pigment retaining their brightness and intensity
over time.
In this
regard, Klein received the Soleanu envelope from
the French Patent office, ie a system peculiar to the French patent system.
What’s interesting is that Klein’s patent did not extend to the
colour or the binding medium, but was limited to its chemical
concoction. Vantablack, on the
other hand, is licensed exclusively to
Kapoor Studios UK for its use in the field of art.
Some sources claim that Mr Kapoor now owns a
copyright in respect of Vantablack. The copyright protection of a
colour has not surfaced yet. As stated above, Klein’s rights over IKB pertained
to a patent, not copyright.
Other instances of ownership of colors are largely in the domain of
trade marks. US courts have seen a plethora such cases-the first being In Re Owens-corning FiberglassCorporation, where
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that in limited
circumstances, a color that has become associated with a specific manufacturer
can qualify as a registrable mark. The appellants in this case were given the
right to prevent competitors from using the color pink in their insulation
products. This marked the first time a company in the US was granted a trade
mark for a particular colour.
Nearly a decade later, the US Supreme Court in Qualitex Co v Jacobson Products Co, Inc, held
that there existed no objection to the use of color alone as a trade mark, when
the colour has attained a secondary meaning and therefore identifies and
distinguishes a particular brand.
Ever since, the courts have dealt with several cases pertaining to the
protection of colours as trade marks, especially in the context of
pharmaceutical trade dress. Vantablack, however, cannott be protected by trade
mark as the question of any secondary meaning identifying it with any
particular brand does not arise.
The idea-expression dichotomy forms the foremost axiom of copyright law. In this regard, “ideas, sentiments or creations
of the imagination” are often contrasted with "the language,
idiom, style, or the outward semblance and exhibition" of such creation. However, the boundary between an idea and an
expression is at times unclear, and as posited by Judge Learned Hand, “nobody
has been able to fix the boundary, and nobody ever can.”
The question in this case is whether a colour forms
an idea or an expression. What is to happen if colours are considered as
expressions of ideas? Say,
red for danger, white for peace, white and gold/blue and black for
consternation, etc. These colours, much like words, form common property to the
human race, and are therefore as susceptible to private appropriation as air or
sunlight. [(Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 86 (1899)] The purpose of
limiting copyrights to expressions, and not ideas is to prevent the
monopolization of the latter. Only when arranged in an original form, can they
merit copyright protection. As held in an Indian landmark ruling,
every expression does not ipso facto become protectable, and
must pass the test of originality, which requires the exercise of skill, labour
and judgment in creating the work. A colour alone is lacking in
originality, and its protection would arguably result in monopolization of an
idea which would strike at the foundations of copyright law.
Additionally,
certain countries (US for
instance) require fixation of the work in a tangible medium as a prerequisite
for copyright protection. Therefore, ideas, plots, themes, and, arguably in the
same vein, color cannot be copyrighted on this ground alone.
As the
requirement of tangible fixation is optional under the Berne Convention, certain countries have opted not to include this requirement in their
domestic laws. The Indian Copyright Act, 1957 (Act) for instance, makes no such
mention. Section 13 of the Act lists the classes of original work over which a
copyright subsists, which includes artistic works, defined under section 2( c )
as: (i) a
painting, sculpture, drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan),
engraving or photograph; (ii) work of architecture; (iii) any other
work of artistic craftsmanship.
A colour
by itself would not form an artistic work under the aforementioned section.
Only when used in a painting, sculpture, drawing, etc, can a copyright be
claimed. Section 16 of the Act further prevents the entitlement of copyrights
or any similar rights except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It
therefore would not be plausible to categorize Vantablack as an ‘artistic
work', thereby making it unfit for copyright protection.
Like
Klein, SurreyNanoSystems could patent the material. The company’s FAQ portal states that Vantablack is not a paint or pigment, but comprises of
a functionalized forest of millions upon millions of nanotubules, grown at 750
degrees centigrade.
Vantablack
has diverse industrial
applications in aerospace
technology, touch screens, ultra light wiring, etc. The material appears to
check the boxes of novelty, non-obviousness and utility, thereby making it
patentable. Thus, if Vantablack was to be monopolized in any manner, it would
be more palatable as a patent, rather than copyright."
Interesting examination, but a little bit confusing in parts: you say 'Vantablack is licensed exclusively to Kapoor' and then say 'some sources claim Kapoor owns copyright'; but surely there is a distinction between a licence and an assignment?
ReplyDeleteIn the penultimate para you also explain that SNS state that Vantablack is not a paint or pigment but essentially a technology - I think this distinction is also important because it's not like a colour that anyone can mix. Essentially unless someone else invents their own version of Vantablack, or steals some, where would the application necessary for an infringement even take place?