Tuesday, 23 May 2017

Conference Report - 'Moral Rights and New Technologies: Authorship, Attribution and Integrity in a Digital World'

This writer had the great pleasure of attending a conference on ‘Moral Rights and New Technologies: Authorship, Attribution, and Integrity in a Digital World,’ held on 31 March and 1 April at the University of Glasgow. It was truly a feast for the intellect – an interdisciplinary and international event, with outstanding scholars leading discussions on the relevance of moral rights to an ever-evolving digital world and a “post-truth” era.

Moral rights – a brief introduction

For those who may not be closely familiar with this area of intellectual property law, moral rights are rights that protect the author’s personality. They usually arise in the context of copyright law, and the most commonly discussed moral rights include; 

- The right of attribution – the right of the author to be named as such.
- The right of the author to publish anonymously and pseudonymously.
- The right of the author to prevent the work of another from being credited to him or her (though not always).
- The right of integrity – the right of the author to object to alterations, distortions and mutilations of the work.
- The right of divulgation – the right of the author to be the first to release the work to the world.
 
Creative works are protected under two different types of philosophies: the copyright systems of common law countries, and the author’s rights systems of civil law countries.

University of Glasgow
The author’s rights systems originated within the Civilian traditions on the European continent. This approach emerged in Germany as a means of justifying the payment of authors for their works. In 1793, Fichte published an essay, ‘Proof of the illegality of reprinting: a rationale’, in which he separated the concepts of form (the expression of the author, imbued with his very personality) and content (the ideas contained within the text that the reader is free to appropriate). This thesis gained popularity, and as a result, protection within Germany for creative works came to be based on protection of the expression of the author. His personality permeates the creative work, and that is the reason why the work is protected. Economic rights merely flow from the personality right, the personality right being based on the protection of the author’s expression. Across the European continent, legal systems for the protection of creative works are based upon the protection of the personality of the author of a creative work. Moral rights in these systems are therefore of great significance.


Copyright systems within the common law traditions take a divergent approach. The creative work – the poem, sculpture, painting or melody – is conceptually reduced (or typified) to a piece of property. Within copyright systems (such as the UK or the US), creative works are essentially treated as tradable commodities to be bought and sold in the market. Since the creative object is treated as a kind of property, the rights of the author per se have never been of paramount importance within the common law legal traditions. Rather, the focus of protection within copyright systems is the conceptualisation of the creative work as a piece of property.

The US and the Berne Convention

In terms of international copyright protection, the U.S. had, until 1989, failed to join the Berne Convention, the international framework of copyright protection across (practically) the entire globe. The reticence of the U.S. was due in large part to the moral rights provisions contained within the Berne Convention, in Article 6bis, coupled with Berne’s requirement of automatic protection to the author upon the creation of a work – a marked contrast to the U.S. copyright system, which was then based on the need for registration to enjoy rights [Berne Art. 5(2)]. In spite of these reservations, the U.S. eventually decided to join Berne: the draw of international copyright protection for its citizens and co-operation across the jurisdictions of the signatory states became strong enough for the U.S. to wish to join, and to make an attempt at incorporating moral rights into its legal landscape. To deal with moral rights, the U.S. took the step of creating the ‘Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990’. On 01 March 1989 the U.S. acceded to the Berne Convention. The adherence of the U.S. to its moral rights obligations under the Berne Convention was, and continues to be, an extremely controversial topic amongst experts, since the U.S. implemented moral rights only for visual artists, which are in themselves of particularly narrow and limited effect. Many experts question whether the U.S. is meeting its obligations under the Berne Convention’s moral rights clause at all.

The Conference

Kim Isbell of the US Copyright Office kicked off the event by commenting on the current Study on the Moral Rights of Attribution and Integrity being carried out by the U.S. Copyright Office. This study is the first domestic review of moral rights since U.S. accession to the Berne Convention almost 30 years ago. The purpose of the study is to:

“review how existing U.S. law, including provisions found in Title 17 of the U.S. Code and other federal and state laws, protects the moral rights of attribution and integrity and whether any additional protection is advisable in this area.”  

As part of its Study, the U.S. Copyright Office held an event in April 2016 – Authors, Attribution, and Integrity: Examining Moral Rights in the United States. Professor Mira Rajan Sundara – a copyright expert with particular expertise on moral rights – attended this event and it was there that the Glasgow Conference had its genesis. Professor Rajan Sundara was invited by the U.S. Copyright Office to organise an event designed to bring world leading copyright experts and representatives of stakeholder groups together, to discuss digital challenges facing moral rights and help to support the current U.S. study process.


Substantive Presentations

We began with case studies (through a moral rights lens, of course) on literature, music sampling and music composition.

Mira Sundara Rajan
Mira Sundara Rajan presented on literature, highlighting moral rights difficulties posed through posthumous publications (Hemingway’s ‘A Moveable Feast’, and Fitzgerald’s ‘The Last Tycoon’), as well as the difficulties of translations of Doctor Zhivago. Professor Sundara Rajan also covered the fascinating issues surrounding the creation of an authoritative Standard Edition (also posthumous) of the works of the prolific national poet of India in the South Indian language of Tamil, Subramania Bharati.

Pravin Anand of Anand and Anand covered the music sampling case study. ‘Bachna Ae Haseeno’ – a song from the 1977 Bollywood film ‘Hum Kisi Se Kam Nahi’ – was sampled for the title song of the 2008 film of the same name, Bachna Ae Haseeno. The moral rights issues in this case were intriguing, as the singers in both the original and the remix were father and son.

Louise Harris, prominent sonic and audio-visual artist based at the University of Glasgow, gave a presentation dealing with situations in which her moral rights had been infringed. Specific difficulties encountered by Dr Harris involve the performance of her audio-visual compositions on equipment with insufficient bandwidth to competently perform her work. This poor-quality bandwidth – as well as lack of three-dimensional acoustic spaces – has led to situations in which she felt that her work had been – to an extent – mutilated, and the essence of the work was lost.

Similarities and differences of moral rights laws across jurisdictions was a major theme of the conference, with Michel Walter presenting on the traditions of the monist jurisdictions of Austria and Germany, Marta Garcia-Leon on Spain, Valérie-Laure Benabou on France, Giuseppe Mazziotti on Italy and Rudolf Leska on the Czech Republic.
 
Concerto Caledonia
In the middle of the day, the presenters enjoyed a different kind of session, with David McGuinness and Concerto Caldeonia offering a performance and discussion of moral rights from the unique perspective of historical Scottish music. The thought-provoking and enjoyable session delivered by the enthusiastic musicians was a highlight of the day.

Day 2

Mr. Justice Arnold
Mr Justice Richard Arnold began day two of proceedings with the keynote of the Conference – a most excellent and impressive overview of moral rights law within the UK, as well as a brief introduction of his current explorations into moral rights with Professor Rajan Sundara.

Mr Justice Arnold presented on the case, The Creative Foundation v Dreamland Leisure Limited and others, over which he presided in the High Court of Justice. This case involved a Banksy mural, which had been removed from the wall of a building and shipped to the U.S. for valuation and eventual auction. Mr Justice Arnold emphasised during his presentation that, despite the UK not having particularly strong moral rights per se, moral rights are capable of being protected through other mechanisms of the law. In the particular case in question, the decision hinged, rather than on a law of moral rights, the law of lease-holding.

Mr Justice Arnold also presented on his current work being undertaken with Professor Sundara Rajan. This fascinating project concerns Elena Feranti (a novelist publishing under a pseudonym), and whether authors have a right of pseudonymity in the UK. A forthcoming article to be published by the illustrious pair will explore issues on whether Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights might protect Feranti’s pseudonymity, as well as whether a pseudonymity right might be extrapolated from other areas within UK law.

The rest of the second day focussed on the important issue of moral rights in the digital environment. This is a concept currently in flux, as new technologies allow users to intervene in creative works as has never before been possible. The ways in which we understand authorship and what a creative work is are being challenged with the ever increasing digital presence within our lives. Critically assessing the conceptual challenges posed by digital innovations to existing moral rights schemes is at the cutting edge of our understanding of moral rights law. 

Christian Geib, PhD candidate at the University of Strathclyde, covered moral rights in Text and Data Mining, and whether moral rights issues could be encountered in this area. Examples he suggested included the data mining of particular creative works and whether the results of such data mining could potentially infringe an author’s moral rights.


Florian De Rouck
Florian De Rouck from Verhaegen Walraevens, discussed artificial intelligence. He presented on the moral rights repercussions regarding artificial intelligence, from the 1960’s software Aaron to the cutting edge Google Magenta project, which is designed to ‘advance the state of the art in machine intelligence for music and art generation’. As it develops to greater and greater complexity, artificial intelligence will surely destabilise our current understanding of the concept of the author and the creative product.
Erin Simon
Erin Simon, Product Counsel from Google, discussed the potential alternative legal mechanisms used in the U.S. to protect moral rights, including the use of the various creative commons licences. For example, an author may licence a creative work and require only that attribution is given – a CC BY licence. Proponents of this approach argue that the creative commons system protects moral rights in an indirect way.

Johannes Grossekettler discussed the moral rights implications of 3D printing. Where low resolution or poor quality printers are used in replicating works, Johannes discussed the potential moral rights issues that may apply in these circumstances.

Owing to the truly multi-disciplinary aspect of the event, the final two speakers were a particular treat. They are both successful artists who kindly gave us their view of moral rights and how their work is affected by these rights. Ela Orleans spoke about her own experiences of both her copyright and moral rights being infringed, and her difficulties in this area. She expressed that she often feels frustrated with YouTube and other platforming sites that do not do much in the way of prohibiting infringement of her work.  


Martha de Francisco
Martha de Francisco presented on her work as a renowned tonmeister. Having worked with Alfred Brendel for around twenty years and having recorded with a great many other outstanding musicians, Martha has developed a prolific and stellar career. Her work as tonmeister entails recording and producing classical music. With specialist knowledge in classical music, Martha understands the difficulties faced by musicians in interpreting and lifting the music from the score and in turn is expertly able to capture that music in recording. She posited whether moral rights should be accorded to those in her highly-skilled and creative profession. 

The Conference was truly a fantastic exploration of moral rights within our digital world. These issues are only going to grow in importance as our lives become ever more intertwined with the digital. Delegates from the conference are planning to produce a book featuring artworks and music, alongside the text, relating to the areas discussed at the Conference, which I am sure will be a fascinating read. The group submitted comments to the U.S. Copyright Office in relation to the ongoing moral rights study in the U.S. The Conference was a most enriching event, with speakers of exceptional calibre and of multidisciplinary reach.

From left to right:
 Johannes Grossekettler, Pravin Anand & Florian De Rouck
This writer wishes to thank and acknowledge the kind assistance and expertise of Professor Mira Sundara Rajan in the drafting of this blog.

Monday, 22 May 2017

IPSoc Event Report: The ever-evolving law on the "communication to the public" right

When the IPKat is communicating to the public,
unlike with the CJEU, no one is left in any doubt...
First published on the IPKat

Last week, members of IPSoc descended on Simmons & Simmons’ offices for a gallop through some recent developments in copyright law, given by IPKat’s own Dr Eleonora Rosati. For those who couldn’t be there, KatFriend Alex Woolgar (Allen & Overyreports on the highlights:
"To paraphrase the noted fictional fashion designer Mugatu, the economic right which is “so hot right now” is of course the right of communication to the public (CTP) (Article 3(1) InfoSoc Directive). Readers who were present at the Views from the Judiciary session at Fordham 2017 will know that Mr Justice Arnold agrees, as does Marco Giorello (Acting Head of Unit – Copyright, DG Connect, European Commission). The CTP right, whose modern roots can be found in Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, is being buffeted by the fast-moving currents of the digital age. The strongest of these currents include ubiquitous Internet hyperlinking, and the shift from consumption of content away from non-transient download and towards streaming (whether via YouTube, Spotify or otherwise) – streaming made up 35.37% of EU Internet traffic in 2012, and continues to grow.

The CTP right appears on one level deceptively simple – there must be (i) an act of communication, (ii) to the public. Since the 2003 implementation deadline of the InfoSoc Directive, there have been 18 CJEU decisions (plus two pending decisions) on the CTP right. This is perhaps indicative of the CJEU’s struggle to clarify what is essentially a sparsely-defined right, as the technological means and trends in communication and consumption of content change over time. Eleonora noted that CJEU jurisprudence on the CTP right is at times inconsistent – compounded, no doubt, by the fact the CJEU has no binding precedent to follow.

The seminar focused firstly on two recent decisions – GS Media and Filmspeler – and then touched briefly on the Commission’s role in all of this, and the ever-popular topic of the impact of Brexit. 
GS Media has already been reported on extensively (not least on this very blog). The photographs in question were leaked (i.e. made available without the right holder’s permission) on an Australian file-sharing website, to which GS Media provided a hyperlink. AG Wathelet reviewed the state of the law following Svensson and BestWater, and went on to conclude that there was no act of communication, because this requires the alleged infringer to “make available” the content. The photographs were already freely accessible via the file-sharing website, so GS Media merely facilitated access, which the AG considered not to be an act of communication. In other words, GS Media’s intervention in the process was not “indispensable”. A significant reason for the AG’s opinion seems to have been policy: specifically, that hyperlinking is essential to the architecture and proper functioning of the Internet. In this way, the AG’s opinion was perhaps correct to steer away from an overly rigid interpretation of Svensson, but the CJEU took a different approach. Mindful of the delicate balance between right holders and the public as a whole, the CJEU in effect chose not to exempt hyperlinking to freely accessible content from copyright infringement completely. The CJEU paid little heed to AG Wathelet’s neat making available / facilitation distinction. Instead, the CJEU emphasised two non-autonomous and interdependent criteria: did the alleged infringer (i) have a profit-making intention; and (ii) know that the linked-to content was unlawful? As the law now stands, the lawfulness of providing a link to freely-accessible content will be determined by the answer to these two questions, as Eleonora’s helpful table summarises far more succinctly than the author could hope to.

The CJEU’s judgment does however leave open some interesting questions. Is a profit-making intention to be determined by reference to the link itself in isolation, or to the context of the website as a whole? National courts seem best placed to weigh the two non-autonomous interdependent criteria on the evidence, but this issue may require further clarification from the CJEU (although in applying GS Media, the German and Swedish courts seemed comfortable enough to decide it was the context of the whole website which is relevant). Also, is the notion of an “indispensable intervention” dead, or just resting?

The more recent Filmspeler judgment (reported on this blog here and here) seems to answer the second question, and more besides. The defendant, Mr Wullems, sold online a multimedia player, which acts as a medium between a source of audio-visual data and a television screen. The underlying software included several hyperlinks to copyright content online, some of which was originally made available without the consent of the relevant right holders, so that such content could be played seamlessly on TV via the Filmspeler app (the author wonders aloud whether there was also scope for discussion as to whether interfacing between computer and TV screen is quite the same technical means as “traditional” hyperlinking). The CJEU held that this hyperlinking was a CTP within the meaning of Article 3(1). While Mr Wullems’ actions were held to be an “intervention” for CTP purposes, the word “indispensible” was conspicuously absent. Instead, in its judgment the CJEU focused on the two non-autonomous and interdependent criteria as used in GS Media.

It is up for debate whether these cases represent a step-change in the CTP right, or a gentler evolution. But it is apparent that the CTP right is being fleshed out to adapt to the technological and social changes alluded to above. As Eleonora noted, these decisions do seem to open the way for courts to attribute primary liability for copyright infringement to mere “facilitators” (and presumably the CJEU will follow AG Szpunar and make similar findings of liability in the Pirate Bay / Ziggo reference. It remains to be seen whether this jurisprudence will bring high-profile platforms such as YouTube into the sights of national courts – to date there have been no decisions of national courts which definitively say YouTube undertakes acts constituting CTP.

Eleonora further noted that the so-called “value gap” proposal under Article 13 of the draft Directive on copyright in the DSM (to mandate licence agreements with right holders unless the platform is eligible for safe harbour, and to put in place appropriate and proportionate measures to prevent infringement) seems to presuppose that such platforms and content aggregators do undertake acts which are CTP within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. It does seem that this potential lacuna may have been closed by the CJEU before it arises in practice. 
Finally, Brexit once again reared its ugly head. Eleonora suggested that because copyright is only partially harmonised, how copyright in the UK will look post-Brexit has received less attention than other IP rights. The proposed Great Repeal Bill will likely mean that nothing much will change on Day 1 of actual Brexit (given that the nine relevant Directives have already been transposed into UK law, and the two pending copyright reform package may well be ignored during the Article 50 period). But also, in the medium-term, the law is unlikely to change much. There will be no further CJEU references, but unless and until the law is changed substantively, CJEU judgments are likely to remain persuasive, at Supreme Court level at least. It remains to be seen whether the UK courts will draw any distinction between pre- and post-Brexit CJEU decisions (much will depend on how far UK and EU copyright law diverge). In the longer-term, judgments from other Commonwealth countries may again become more persuasive. Some have suggested that Brexit presents copyright opportunities e.g. to introduce a general US-style “fair use” defence. This may have the advantage of flexibility, but it comes with its own problems, such as uncertainty, and potentially an erosion of right holders’ protection and a dulling effect on publication of creative works.

The author’s “take homes” from the seminar were that copyright, and the CTP right in particular, remain strong candidates for evolution over the next several years, due to technological and social change, the Commission’s and the CJEU’s response to such change, and the as-yet uncertain impact of Brexit."
Posted By Annsley Merelle Ward to The IPKat on 5/22/2017 02:45:00 am

Wednesday, 17 May 2017

Digital copies, exhaustion, and blockchains: lack of legal clarity to be offset by technological advancement and evolving consumption patterns?

Digital copies, exhaustion, and blockchains: lack of legal clarity to be offset by technological advancement and evolving consumption patterns?


By Eleonora Rosati and first published on the IPKat

"Buy digital":
but are you really buying to own?
Can you resell the books, CDs, and DVDs that you are no longer interested in having? The answer to this question is easy: usually, yes.

But what about the case of ebooks, music tracks, and films downloaded from the internet? Well, here, the question is more difficult and - at least at the EU level - does not have a clear answer yet. The issue is particularly complex due to both practical and legal reasons.

The following post can be accompanied by these slides I prepared for a recent lecture at Bocconi University in Milan.

Degradation (or lack thereof)

A perfect analogy between physical and digital copies of a work does not seem really possible to be drawn in the first place. Unlike analogue/physical copies (eg a book), in principle the digital copy of a work is not subject to any sort of appreciable degradation. If you read the same ebook five times, the quality of the copy you have remains substantially unaltered. However, can you say the same about a physical copy of a book?

Control (or lack thereof)

Another argument that is sometimes advanced to highlight the difference between analogue and physical copies is that greater control can be exerted over the transmission of a physical copy. If you allowed someone to transfer his/her digital copy of a work, how can you make sure that this person would not just create a new copy and keep his/her original one?

While this argument may hold some truth in principle, reality is that anti-copying technologies have been in place for years and some (albeit ill-fated) second-hand digital marketplaces [eg ReDigi, which was at the centre of an interesting US case back in 2013] have demonstrated that it is possible to allow the transfer of one's own copy without real possibilities of duplication. Also latest developments (see below) suggest that the control argument may be short-lived.

Legal obstacles

Besides technical considerations the legislative framework appears (problematically) ambiguous, both in Europe and the US. 

As readers will know, the right of distribution (which is relevant to the present discussion) is subject to exhaustion, further to the first lawful sale of a copyright work or a copy thereof. 

While for analogue/physical copies the concept of exhaustion is not difficult to grasp (you buy a book at a bookshop - you become the owner of the copy - you can resell that copy), the same is hardly true in relation to digital copies. Essentially, the issue is twofold, ie whether:

(1) There is ever an actual 'sale' of a digital copy: even if we see 'buy' all the time in relation to Amazon ebooks or iTunes tracks, the actual contract we formally conclude by 'buying' an ebook or a music file is a licence agreement, not a sale.
(2) The person who 'purchases'/'buys' a digital copy ever becomes the 'owner' of that copy.

The answer – at least formally – may be in the negative in both cases.

The US scenario

In relation to the US, it is unclear [the ReDigi decision contains some hints, but these are not decisive, as I suggested here] whether this country's copyright law allows application of the first sale doctrine within §109 of the US Copyright Act to digital copies, although this provision has been said to be technology-neutral in that it would not distinguish between analogue and digital copies. This suggests that there is nothing in US law that states that the notion of ‘copy’ must be intended as confined solely to tangible copies.

This said, however, during a 2013 lecture at Columbia Law School former US Register of Copyright and current president and CEO of the Association of American Publishers, Maria Pallante, suggested that US law does not allow for the possibility to resell digital copies of copyright works, and that this is a matter for Congress to address.

Not entirely uncommon reaction 
to the UsedSoft ruling
The EU scenario

Moving to Europe, readers will remember that this blog has closely followed [Katposts here] the debate arisen in the aftermath of the (controversial) 2012 decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in UsedSoft, C-128/11, in which our favourite court affirmed the possibility of digital exhaustion under the Software Directive in relation to computer programs downloaded from the internet. 

While the CJEU confirmed the general principle of UsedSoft in its more recent (2016) decision in Microsoft, C-166/15 [here], it remains unclear whether and to what extent this conclusion can be extended to works other than computer programs and that fall under the scope of the general EU copyright directive, ie the InfoSoc Directive.

In his Opinion [here] in VOB, C-174/15 (an e-lending case) Advocate General (AG) Szpunar held the view that the issue remains unaddressed at the EU level, and that the 2015 CJEU decision in Allposters, C-419/13 [Katposts here] did not provide a response to the question whether Article 4 of the InfoSoc Directive envisages digital exhaustion.

While this appears true from a formal standpoint (Allposters is a traditional – albeit unusual - analogue case, and has nothing to do with the digital world), my view is that - if the CJEU was given a real opportunity to address the issue of digital exhaustion - there might be a divergence from the path taken in UsedSoft. First, in Allposters the CJEU was pretty clear that exhaustion only applies to the tangible support (corpus mechanicum) of a work, not the work itself. Secondly, although dismissing the idea that the reference had anything to do with exhaustion, in its 2016 VOB decision [here] the CJEU appeared to think along lines similar to those used in Allposters when it suggested that exhaustion relates to the "physical medium" of a work.

Whether a digital copy can ever have a tangible support remains to be seen …

What is new

Amidst all this uncertainty, the latest news is that technological advancement might reduce - if not remove altogether - technological concerns surrounding the possibility of digital exhaustion (particularly the issue of different degrees of control).

The most recent installment is in fact that blockchain tracking technology [yes, the technology originally invented to make bitcoin transactions safer] is being proposed as an aid to make ebooks increasingly akin to analogue/physical copies. Blockchain technology allows in fact readers to 'own' an ebook and 'borrow' it to others, thank to the possibility to track this peculiar type of transaction.

The first 'disintegrating e-book' has just been placed on the market: you can see how it works here.

IFPI Global Music Report 2017
However

While technological arguments against allowing or denying digital exhaustion may become increasingly weaker, the law around digital exhaustion remains uncertain. In addition, at the moment it appears that the issue of digital exhaustion is not really part of any meaningful policy discussion, whether in the US or EU.

This said, shifting consumer behaviours may ultimately make addressing the issue of digital exhaustion redundant, at least as regards certain types of copyright content. There seems to be in fact an increasing trend towards consuming copyright content not by means of actually possessing (NOTE: ≠ owning) of a digital copy (eg an internet download) but rather through streaming content online. This appears for instance to be the case of music. In its latest Global Music Report, IFPI highlighted how streaming continues to grow, while the number of downloads has been decreasing over time.

Overall, digital exhaustion might become one of those issues that the law has failed to address clearly in a timely fashion but that ultimately might be offset by technological advancement and evolving consumption patterns. Whether this wait-and-see approach is desirable, however, is a different story …

Wednesday, 3 May 2017

Wish to study media and entertainment law remotely? Here's the option for you

The 1709 Blog has just learned that also next academic year London Metropolitan University will offer its popular Postgraduate Diploma/LLM in Media and Entertainment Law

The course has been designed specifically for those working in, or wishing to enter the media and entertainment fields; or for those with, or without legal backgrounds who wish to broaden their expertise.

The 12-month programme comprises an introductory module, eight compulsory core modules and two specialist modules (of which you choose to study one). Each of the core modules give a thorough grounding in the core components of media and entertainment law whilst referring to aspects and important points of law from all of the other modules.

The course is taught by the self-study of a comprehensive module manual and with students encouraged to read from specified case law and legal journals. There is a logical progression through a complex syllabus and students are given the opportunity to discuss theoretical issues as well as practical problem solving. 

For more information, just click here.