Showing posts with label Eleonora Rosati. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eleonora Rosati. Show all posts

Thursday, 26 December 2019

Paris Court of Appeal confirms that Koons’s 'Naked' sculpture infringes copyright in 'Enfants' photograph, rejecting freedom of the arts and parody defences

Paris Court of Appeal confirms that Koons’s 'Naked' sculpture infringes copyright in 'Enfants' photograph, rejecting freedom of the arts and parody defences
By Eleonora Rosati writing for the IPKat and first published on the IPKat here 
Last week, the Paris Court Appeal ruled (decision No 152/2019) in favour of the estate of late French photographer Jean-François Bauret in proceedings brought against, inter alia, US artist Jeff Koons (an artist who, as readers will know, has been sued a few times for copyright infringement: see, eg, here, here, and here). 
The action related to the unauthorized reproduction of a photograph (Bauret’s ‘Enfants’, shown below on the left hand side) in a sculpture (Koons's ‘Naked’, below on the right hand side). 
'Enfants' (L) and 'Naked' (R)
The defendants had advanced a number of arguments, including that: 
- ‘Enfants’ is not original; 
- even if it was, ‘Naked’, would not incorporate any original elements thereof; 
- even if prima facie infringement was established, freedom of the arts and parody would prevail over copyright.
The court rejected them all. Let’s see what happened in greater detail. 
Background 
In 1970, Bauret realized a black-and-white photograph titled ‘Enfants’. No print of the photograph was sold, but in 1975 the photographer authorized the making of postcards carrying the image of the work. 
In 2014, the Bauret estate found out that Jeff Koons had realized a porcelain sculpture, ‘Naked’, which was similar to the ‘Enfants’ photograph. Koons’s work had been made in 1988 in 4 copies as part of the Banality series, a readymade collection of artworks that contains a mix of pop art and kitsch. 
The sculpture was never exhibited in France, though in 2015 it should have been on display in an exhibition at the Centre Pompidou in Paris. 
The Bauret estate sent a warning letter to both Koons and the museum. For reasons linked to damage during transportation, ‘Naked’ was not included in the exhibition in the end. The museum subsequently also removed the image of the sculpture from the exhibition catalogue. 
A lawsuit followed and, in 2017, the TGI Paris partly ruled in favour of the photographer’s estate. Both parties appealed. 
Aside from issues concerning the personal liability of Koons, the judgment is particularly interesting as far as substantive issues of copyright subsistence and infringement are concerned. 
Originality of ‘Enfants’
As regards the protectability of the photograph, the defendants had submitted that Bauret had failed to express his own personal touch. The choices made were not sufficient for the work to be considered his own intellectual creation, in that the photograph represented a ‘spontaneous pose’ assumed by the two children and the estate had failed to demonstrated where the originality of such creation would lie. 
The court disagreed, and held that Bauret’s work revealed a new concept of nude, which is raw and devoid of any sexual connotation, and such as to disclose the personality of the author. Among other things, the particular use of the light was meant to confer some ‘sculptural’ character to the photograph and the overall composition (including the pose and expression of the children) served to add a ‘geometric’ dimension to the work. According to the court, the latter in particular served to dispel any idea that the pose of the children would be spontaneous: rather, they had been directed by the photographer to assume a certain pose and expression. 
In light of all this, like at first instance, the photograph was found to be original and protectable. 
Prima facie infringement
The claimants pointed to the several similarities between the photograph and challenged the relevance of the argument, made by the defendants, that the different character (real vs fictional) and message (children’s innocence vs Adam & Eve) conveyed by, respectively, the photograph and the sculpture would exclude the recognizability of the former in the latter (it should be noted, however, that Koons never denied that he had had access to the photograph). 
The defendants submitted that the sculpture had not reproduced anything that would confer originality to the photograph, and highlighted the differences between these two, including the colour, dimensions (a 2D photo vs a 3D sculpture) and size ('Naked''s height is 1m), as well as other differences (hair colour, navel, children’s gaze, position of the hands, background, elements in the composition). 
The court disagreed, and found that the sculpture had actually incorporated the “essential features” of the photograph, which constituted its original character. 

Defences 
Copyright and freedom of expression 
The court also considered an important point: to what extent can freedom of expression – including freedom of artistic expression – restrict or even trump copyright protection? 
To answer this, the court followed a similar approach to the one indicated (correctly) by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its recent Grand Chamber rulings in Funke Medien, Spiegel Online, and Pelham [Katposts here, here,  and here] notably that only available copyright exceptions and limitations can be relied upon in an infringement action, and that it is not possible to invoke directly fundamental rights and freedoms or a ‘fair use’ of a work to trump the application of copyright's exclusive rights. 
In this sense, like the CJEU, the Paris court confirmed that the balance between different rights and freedoms is internal to the copyright system, and has been undertaken by legislature when envisaging available copyright exceptions and limitations. 
In all this, the court also considered that the unlicensed use of the photograph by Koons was not “necessary” for the exercise of his own freedom of expression. 
Parody 
The defendant had also raised an argument that the use at issue could qualify as parody. The court referred to the 2014 CJEU Deckmyn decision [Katposts here] and the requirements that, for a work to be considered a parody, first, it must evoke an existing work while being noticeably different from it and, second, it must constitute an expression of humour or mockery. 
The court considered that neither requirement would be fulfilled in the case at issue. 
'Chats', by Merpel
Comment 
The decision appears correct from a substantial standpoint and is also compliant with case law of the CJEU. The court correctly applied the Painer test (though it did not expressly refer to that decision) for determining originality of a photograph, by considering the ‘free and creative choices’ that the photographer had made in the pre-shooting phase, when taking the photograph, and in the post-production phase.
It also appropriately applied (again, without mentioning them expressly), the CJEU holdings in Funke Medien, Spiegel Online, and Pelham. 
In all this, the most interesting aspect of the decision probably relates to the application of the CJEU Deckmyn decision. As mentioned, one of the characteristics of a parody is that it must constitute an expression of humour or mockery. The CJEU did not clarify whether this requirement is fulfilled when an alleged parody pursues a humorous intent, or whether it is also required that it achieves it (as the Advocate General had suggested in his Opinion). 
If the test was ‘intent’, then the exception under Article 5(3)(k) of the InfoSoc Directive would be broader than if a humorous ‘effect’ was also required. Above all, requiring just intent would be better compliant with the need to safeguard parody as a means to exercise freedom of expression. As I discus at greater length here, the difficulties that might arise should a humorous effect be required, lead to the conclusion the correct test under Deckmyn is that of a humorous ‘intent’. 
In its decision the Paris Court of Appeal suggested that both intent and effect might fall within the concept of ‘expression of humour or mockery’ when it stated that: “La parodie doit aussi présenter un caractère humoristique, faire oeuvre de raillerie ou provoquer le rire” (“The parody must also have a humorous character, make fun of or provoke laughter”). So, an acceptable parody might perhaps be both one that makes fun without necessarily provoking laughter and one that provokes laughter without necessarily making fun. This might be an interesting take worth elaborating further in future case law. In all this, however, neither was the case of ‘Naked’.
The IPKat thanked Stéphanie Legrand, who represented the Bauret estate in the proceedings, for kindly providing a copy of the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal

Thursday, 8 August 2019

BOOK REVIEW: Copyright and the Court of Justice of the European Union by Eleonora Rosati

Copyright and the Court of Justice of the European Union by Eleonora Rosati [Oxford University Press, 2019, ISBN: 9780198837176, #pp273, £70.00, h/bk]

This title focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), primarily its role, action, and its legacy in the area of copyright law. In light of the fact that copyright policy and legislative initiatives have intensified over the past few years, the book provides a thorough overview of the existing copyright framework, together with an exclusive survey that covers two decades of CJEU decisions in this area of the law – up to August 2018. In doing so, it explores all the key and controversial issues in EU copyright from EU reform proposals (value gap, press publishers' right, fair compensation for private copying, and out-of-commerce works) to the impact of Brexit. 

I. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

As such, the book is presented in three main parts. The first part is looks at the role of the CJEU as an EU institution, the second considers the action of the CJEU and the third part focuses on the CJEU legacy. 

A. Part One: EU harmonization and the functioning of the CJEU 

Chapter one provides an overview of the history of EU harmonisation from the adoption of the 1991 Software Directive and explains the structure, composition and work of the CJEU. It also looks at the references for preliminary ruling, including data on areas of the cases referred to, the referring Member State Courts, intervening Member States, Judges-Rapporteur and Attorney Generals (AG). The research demonstrates the expansive approach to copyright protection, whereby the CJEU tended to agree with the AG opinion when it favoured copyright holders. 

Chapter two focuses on the standards consistently applied in copyright rulings using a data-based case law analysis to demonstrate the principles and policies the CJEU have utilised in the development of EU copyright law. The second part of this chapter provides novel statistical analysis that illustrates the relations between such standards. 

B. Part Two: CJEU Action 

The second part looks at how the underlying principles discussed in Part One play out in specific cases relation to: 1) the construction of economic rights [chapter four], 2) limitations and exceptions [chapter five], 3) enforcement [chapter six]. It delves into the question of whether the CJEU action, which has decreased flexibility at national level and expanded harmonisation, exceeds its competence as an interpreter of EU copyright law. 

This part is made up of four chapters. Chapter three demonstrates the CJEU activity that has extended the boundaries of harmonisation further than the legislation alone, building substantially those areas of law beyond the legislative framework. The conclusions drawn show the common patterns of the CJEU in constructing a copyright system based on high-protection, harmonisation and the development of the internal-market. 

C. Part Three: The Legacy of the CJEU 

The third part focuses on the legacy of the CJEU, specifically from the perspective of the impact on national copyright laws [chapter seven] and of existing case law in the context of current policy discourse around EU copyright reform [chapter eight].

Chapter seven considers the legacy of the CJEU in view of Brexit, tackling the consequences of leaving the EU and EEA. It argues that even in the event of complete departure, the impact of the CJEU case law would remain relevant, highlighted by the reliance of the UK Courts on the EU Courts and amending domestic concepts accordingly. 

Part three concludes with chapter eight highlighting the polarization of the discourse around EU copyright reform. It argues, for example, that the proposals made in the Digital Single Market Directive went against the legislative framework and the interpretations of the CJEU, which need to be taken into account in the discourse of EU copyright reform. 

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH

The goal of the book is to provide readers with a sense of direction of EU copyright cases by rationalising the large number of references to the CJEU and portray an underlying CJEU action in copyright. This is achieved with robust and novel research that sets out the power of the CJEU in shaping EU copyright law to a degree of harmonisation, impact and significance of the decisions. Importantly, it is convincingly argued that harmonisation as and end is not the guiding force of CJEU action, instead it has developed a principle approach to copyright protection. The guarantee of a high level of protection for copyright has allowed the CJEU to develop an expansive protection for copyright and a narrow scope for exceptions and limitations. The need for a fair balance between conflicting interests has also guided the Court to rely on standards such as proportionality and effectiveness, as well as the EU Charter playing an increasingly prevalent role. 

A. Appeal and Audience 

This book makes an important contribution to the literature, as Advocate General Maciej Szpunar (CJEU) explains in the forward: ‘This extremely profound analysis by Professor Rosati of EU copyright protection and relevant Court of Justice decisions constitute uncharted territory, unveiling new information, perhaps never considered, event by members of the Court like myself.’ As such, this book would appeal to anyone interested in European Copyright law, including practitioners, judges, policy makers, academics, researchers and students. The writing style enables the complexities of EU Copyright issues to be understood, providing clarity to a challenging area of law with rigour and ease. 

THERE IS A 20% DISCOUNT AVAILABLE for individual purchases from the OUP website - Quote promotional code ALFLY5F to claim your 20% discount and with the price of this book discounted to £56 (terms apply). 

Reviewed by Hayleigh Bosher

Monday, 6 July 2015

Who are the addressees of the InfoSoc three-step test? A new article

National courts as addressees
of the InfoSoc three-step test?!?
This question has probably haunted the minds and hearts of many 1709 Blog readers. 

This is because, unlike the three-step test in international copyright instruments, it is uncertain who the addressees of the test in Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive are. Are they national legislatures only, or national legislatures and courts alike?

Mr Justice Richard Arnold and I have just completed an article [available here] on this very issue, that will be published by the Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice.

The title of our contribution is Are national courts the addressees of the InfoSoc three-step test?.

And here's the abstract:

"Directive 2001/29/EC (the ‘InfoSoc Directive’) contains an exhaustive list of exceptions and limitations that Member States are free to implement into their own copyright laws (save that the exemption for temporary copies is mandatory). Article 5(5) incorporates the three-step test and mandates that exceptions and limitations shall only be applied in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder. Unlike the three-step test in international copyright law, it is uncertain whether the three-step test in the InfoSoc Directive is addressed to national courts as well as the legislatures of the Member States.

Recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has provided guidance in this respect. Although the Court has held that Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive is not intended to affect the substantive content of the exceptions contained in Article 5(1), (2) and (3) thereof, and hence cannot extend their scope, and has held that, if acts clearly fall within one of those exceptions, then they satisfy Article 5(5), it has also held that those exceptions must be construed in the light of Article 5(5). More significantly, despite holding that Article 5(5) takes effect only at the time that the exceptions are applied by the Member States, the CJEU has also held that the acts of the defendant in question must satisfy the requirements of Article 5(5). As such, it appears from the CJEU’s jurisprudence that the three-step test in the InfoSoc Directive is addressed at national legislators and courts alike.

The consequence of this is that, even in those Member States that have not transposed the language of the three-step test into their own legal systems, courts must determine not only whether the acts of the defendant in question are eligible for the application of a certain exception or limitation, but also whether they comply with the cumulative conditions set in the InfoSoc three-step test."