Thursday, 15 November 2018

A tasty decision for cheese lovers

The CJEU has  rejected a controversial attempt to use copyright law to protect the distinct taste of a food product, in this case a Dutch cheese. The court explained that taste is too subjective to allow a work to be uniquely identified, even using science, and so cannot be protected.

The Court of Justice concurred with the Advocate General's opinion that an artistic work must be capable of being seen and heard. It's the first time the court has been asked to decide whether copyright applies to taste on an artistic work not defined by the InfoSec Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC)

The case was originally filed in the Dutch courts by the owner of the cream cheese brand Heks'nkaas (witches' cheese), Levola Hengelo. Their product is a spreadable cheese with herbs. It objected to a cream cheese, made by rival manufacturer Smilde Foods since 2014 called "Witte Wievenkaas" (wise-women's cheese), which it claimed "infringed" the flavour of Heks'nkaas. Smilde’s herbed cheese dip contains many of the same ingredients. Witte Wievenkaas is now sold under the name Wilde Wietze Dip.

Levola argued that the taste of food, like literary, scientific or artistic works, could be copyrighted, citing the 2006 case involving Lancôme, the cosmetics company, that had accepted in principle that the scent of a perfume could be eligible for copyright protection. Smilde responded that taste is subjective.

The case went on to the appellate court in Arnhem-Leeuwarden which in turn referred the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.

The upshot of this is the CJEU have found that the taste of a food product is not eligible for copyright protection and the taste of a food product cannot be classified as a ‘work’. In the judgment the Court makes clear that in order to be protected by copyright under the Directive, the taste of a food product must be capable of being classified as a ‘work’ within the meaning of the Directive. Classification as a ‘work’ requires (a) that the subject matter concerned is an original intellectual creation and(b) there must be an ‘expression’ of that original intellectual creation.

In accordance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which was adopted in the framework of the World Trade Organisation and to which the EU has acceded and with the WIPO Copyright Treaty to which the EU is a party, copyright protection may be granted to expressions, but not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such. Accordingly, for there to be a ‘work’ as referred to in the Directive, the subject matter protected by copyright must be expressed in a manner which makes it identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity.

In that regard, the Court found that the taste of a food product cannot be identified with precision and objectivity (unlike say a literary, pictorial, cinematographic or musical work, which is a precise and objective expression).: the taste of a food product will be identified essentially on the basis of taste sensations and experiences, which are subjective and variable. They depend on, amongst other things, factors particular to the person tasting the product concerned, such as age, food preferences and consumption habits, as well as on the environment or context in which the product is consumed.

Moreover, it is not possible in the current state of scientific development to achieve by technical means a precise and objective identification of the taste of a food product which enables it to be distinguished from the taste of other products of the same kind.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the taste of a food product cannot be classified as a ‘work’ and consequently is not eligible for copyright protection under the Directive.

C-310/17 Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV

Readers might want to compare this decision with the European Court of Justice's decision in  which held that a sound can be registered as a trade mark if it is capable of being represented graphically in a clear and easily accessible way - Shield Mark BV v Joost Kist h.o.d.n. Memex (2003). In Sieckmann the ECJ (on appeal from the German Trademark authority) held that a smell could not be registered either by registering the formulae or depositing a sample. The Sieckmann Criteria, a seven part test that goes some way to explaining the ECJ's then reasoning on what might be needed to secure protection and the use of words such as 'clear', 'precise', 'self-contained', 'easily accessible', 'intelligible', 'durable' and 'consistent' - and tested on an objective basis.

Tuesday, 13 November 2018

Looking Further Under the Airbrushed Hoodie

You may have read on this blog a few weeks ago that Balenciaga America is being sued in the Southern District of New York for having allegedly copied the designs of a New York souvenir manufacturer.

Defendant, Balenciaga USA, had allegedly featured Plaintiff’s designs, a stylized New York City skyline, on a hoodie, a tote bag, pouches and skirts. These luxury models had been designed and produced in France by Balenciaga for its 2017 ‘Balenciaga NYC Tourist Collection,’ whereas Plaintiff’s goods are sold in souvenir shops and airports around New York. 

The case is following its course, and Balenciaga America moved last month to oppose Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and an order of seizure. Plaintiff claims that Balenciaga America will be transferring the allegedly infringing merchandise out of the United States and has requested an injunction from the court.

The French fashion house detailed its arguments in a memorandum filed on October 18. It claims that it is holding the 36 products at stake in inventory in the U.S., with no intention to export them, and that the preliminary motion is thus unnecessary. It then goes on presenting its defense to the copyright infringement claim.

The legal standard for preliminary injunction

Section 502 of the Copyright Act gives courts the power to grant temporary and final injunctions in copyright infringement suits.

Before the eBay v. MercExchange Supreme Court patent case in 2006, plaintiffs did not have to show irreparable harm to be awarded injunctive relief, but only needed to establish the likelihood of success of the lawsuit. That changed after eBay v. MercExchange, as the Supreme Court held that a Plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must show he has suffered an irreparable injury. The Supreme Court further explained in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tip in his favors, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.

Plaintiff claims that transferring the products at stake outside of the country would make it more difficult to recover damages for illegal overseas sales. Defendant claims Plaintiff has not showed irreparable harm, and it was merely the importer of the goods in the U.S.  

Defendant quotes Music Sales Ltd. V. Charles Dumont & Son, a 2009 case from the District Court of New Jersey to posit that exporting goods to the U.S. is not infringement under the Copyright Act, unless a predicate act has occurred in the U.S. that is itself infringement under the Copyright Act. Defendant also cited a Second Circuit case, Update Art Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g Ltd., where the court noted that it is “well established that copyright laws generally do not have extraterritorial application.”

Plaintiff does not quote the next phrase in Update Art, which states the exception to the rule, ”when the type of infringement permits further reproduction abroad — such as the unauthorized manufacture of copyrighted material in the United States.” This does not appear, however, to be the case here, as the allegedly infringing designs have been originally designed and produced in France. Selling them in the U.S. does facilitate further reproduction abroad, especially since Defendant wisely pulled these products from the stores.

The copyright infringement defenses

Balenciaga America claims that Plaintiff’s original design is a mere “collage of some of the most well-known landmarks in the New York City skyline” and are not protected by copyright.

These “unprotectible elements” are arranged in a different way than the way they have been arranged by Plaintiff. Balenciaga admits that there may be some similarity in the “look and feel “of both works, but that is because they are both done “in a style that has long been associated with hot rods, graffiti art, and hip hop, a style that is decidedly not original to Plaintiff.” Indeed, hot rod cars are often airbrushed, and both designs mimic this technique. 

As the works at stake contain both protectable and non-protectable elements, Defendant argue that the court must not use the “ordinary observer test,”used by the Second Circuit courts to assess copyright infringement, which asks “whether the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal the same,” but the “discerning ordinary observer test.” This test dos not call for “a piecemeal comparison of each of the protectible elements with its putative imitation, but rather a careful assessment of the "total concept and feel" of the works at issue, after the non-protectible elements have been eliminated from consideration,Silberstein v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc.

Defendant argues that both style of the designs are similar only as they “both pay homage to hot rod and graffiti-style airbrushed styles, which belongs to no one (and everyone).” This argument is a bit farfetched, as validating it would mean that no graffiti artists can claim copyright protection for his or her work as the style belongs to no one.

For Defendants, the New York City landmarks must necessarily be used to evoke the city’s skyline and are thus scènes à faire, as “[d]epictions of New York City landmarks and the words “New York City” are stock images and phrases standard in tourist souvenirs.”

Defendant claimed that it arranged these unprotectible elements in a different way than Plaintiff did in its own works, and that when these elements are filtered out the only copyrightable element left is the arrangement of the building, which is different in Plaintiff’s works and Defendant’s works.  

Plaintiff argued in its reply that Balenciaga “had offered no evidence of unoriginality,” quoting Yurman Design Inc. v. PAJ Inc., where the Second Circuit wrote that "[c]opyright law may protect a combination of elements that are unoriginal in themselves.”

Indeed, as explained by the Supreme Court in Feist, “[f]actual compilations… may possess the requisite originality [to be protected by copyright]. The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original [to be protected by copyright].”

 Fair use

The first of the four fair use factors of Section 107 of the Copyright Act, the purpose and the character of the use, focuses on whether the use is transformative.

Balenciaga America claims that the designs are transformative, as they offer “as subversive, tongue-in-cheek commentary on fusty notions of propriety in fashion, and emphasizing the beauty in the ordinary.” It explains that the design were inspired by ordinary objects, comparing the process to Marcel Duchamp using an urinal to create Fountain and Andy Warhol painting cans of Campbell soup (he even declared tomato to be his favorite flavor, although this has been debunked).

Defendant argues that the second factor, whether the protected work is factual or expressive, also plays in its favor as Plaintiff’s work merely depicts New York’s trademark. The third factor should be in its favor as well as it only tool, if indeed it took anything, unprotectible elements. As for the fourth factor, the effect on the potential market, Defendant notes that “it is not unreasonable to think that Plaintiff’s sales have increased from the publicity around this case.”

I must admit that Plaintiff’s products must be on every fashionable copyright attorney or scholar’s wish list now. See you at JFK’s gift shop!

Image of the Empire State Building, U.S. Government Work.

Poster from the Hot Rod Girl movie (1956).

Monday, 5 November 2018


The UK's Intellectual Property Office has said it has plans to simplify the way websites which contain copyright infringing material are blocked - currently the system is based on injunctive relief that must be obtained from a court - giving orders are often easy to circumvent. In a statement the IPO confirmed that the UK government was now considering "the evidence for and potential impact of administrative site blocking - as opposed to requiring a high court injunction in every case - as well as identifying the mechanisms through which administrative site blocking could be introduced". The IPO's announcement also covered their position on devices that came pre-loaded with apps that can be used to easily access infringing streaming and other content - something of real concern to the entertainment and sports sectors. The government's IP Minister, Sam Gyimah, said that recent criminal prosecutions of individuals concerned with the distribution of devices that enable infringement showed the  current law to be working, but he said that education of the public and the involvement of Trading Standards officers would be followed up, as would new new anti-piracy measures such as administrative site blocking.

As of the end of October, six of the eleven “Trans Pacific Partnership" member states had ratified the Trans Pacific Partnership 11 Agreement.  The agreement will go into effect in two months’ time on December 30 this year. The amendment of Japan's copyright law will be effective on the same day, and the statutory term will be extended to life + 70 years from January 2019, including for those creators whose copyrights would have expired on December 31, 2018. The Diet's Upper House approved the move to match US (and EU) law, and the provision has been retained even though the United States government has withdrawn from the TPP agreement (at least for now).  What is interesting is how the "war extension" in copyright law might (or might not) be accommodated. 

Lucien Greaves, spokesmen and co-founder of The Satanic Temple ("TST"), has tweeted that the Temple is taking legal action against Netflix in connection with the "Chilling Adventures of Sabrina". TST has decided to take this route because of what Greaves claims is copyright infringement. He claims the statue of Baphomet in the hall of the school depicted in the show is a copy of TST’s deity.

From Hell to Heaven? Led Zeppelin have asked the Ninth Circuit appeals court to reconsider its recent ruling in the "Stairway To Heaven" copyright lawsuit 'en banc' to determine the law in the case that involves allegations that the 1971 classic is rip-off of the 1968 instrumental song "Taurus" recorded by Spirit and written by Randy "California" Wolfe's whose estate brought the claim. The group's representatives argue that by overturning the original judgement, the appeals court could "cause jurors to find infringement just because the same unprotected elements are present, upsetting the 'delicate balance'" between copyright protection and the freedom of music creators to employ common techniques and musical elements when composing music" and "if uncorrected," the Ninth Circuit's recent conclusion will "allow a jury to find infringement based on very different uses of public domain material" which, it then argues, "will cause widespread confusion in copyright cases in this circuit."  You can compare the two recordings here and a very interesting analysis by TJR here.  'Top 10 Sound Alike Songs' here

Seven sports photographers have been given another chance to pursue copyright allegations against the National Football League (NFL) in the U.S. The World Intellectual Property Review reports that the NFL had asked that the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit hold an en banc rehearing of the matter, which was decided against the NFL last month - this has been denied. The 2013 complain relates to claims by the photographers against 
against the NFL, all 32 NFL teams, the Associated Press (AP), and image companies Replay Photos and Getty Images that the defendants exceeded the terms of original licence agreements that granted limited use of certain images. The case was filed in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York (image: C Watts). 

And finally, Lyor Cohen is the latest YouTube executive to take aim at the planned reforms to EU Copyright Law, and in particular Article 13. An ex-record label man himself, Cohen is now YouTube’s global head of music and he posted a warning about the new Copyright Directive saying “Let me be clear: we understand and support the intent of Article 13. We need effective ways for copyright holders to protect their content” adding “But we believe that the current proposal will create severe unintended consequences for the whole industry. We still have a couple of weeks to work together towards a better final version of the law. The music industry should really pay attention to these unintended consequences - the system that largely contributes to their success is at risk of major change in the European Union”, opining that "Remixes and covers, tutorials, fan tributes, parodies" were all at risk, and that "these are such powerful promotional tools for the industry". More on the Verge here.

Friday, 26 October 2018

What is rarer than the unicorn? A dress protected by copyright?

Roy Halston, the creator of the Halston brand, is remembered by fashion historians for his use of ultrasuede fabric, a soft manmade fabric imitating suede which could be machine-washed, and for his simple, yet sophisticated designs. While his main line was designed and priced to attract high-income customers, he also designed a line for mass-retailer J.C. Penney. Roy Halston lost control of his brand before dying in 1990, but the Halston Heritage brand has made a comeback in recent years and still sells clothes and accessories, some of which are somewhat reminiscent of the original designs. 

On October 15, the Halston company filed a copyright infringement suit in the central district of California against G-III, which is the exclusive licensor for Calvin Klein. Defendant produces and sells women’s clothes and accessories under the Calvin Klein trademark.

At issue are three Halston dresses which were allegedly copied by Defendant. 
Plaintiff's Design A

First there is “Subject Design A” dress. The top of the dress is a simple sleeveless shift, with a round neckline, flaring asymmetrically below the waist, and revealing a bottom dress in contrasting color. The company has applied to register its copyright (good luck).

Defendant sold a dress which Plaintiff found to be a copy of Subject Design A, arguing in the complaint that “it is apparent that the elements, materials, place, movement, centering, composition, colors, arrangement, overlay, appearance and structure of the design [sic] are substantially and confusingly similar, if not identical.”

Plaintiff manufactured and sold another dress, ‘Subject Design B’, a belted sleeveless dress, with a round neckline, gently flaring out asymmetrically, revealing the lower part of the left thigh of the wearer and its contrasting lining. Defendant also manufactured and sold a belted sleeveless, with a round neckline gently flaring out asymmetrically, revealing the lower part of the left thigh of the wearer and its contrasting lining. Plaintiff does not indicate in the complaint that it is in the process of registering the copyright for Subject Design B, but repeats the substantially and confusingly similar claim.
Defendant's dress

There is also ‘Subject Design C,’a full length sleeveless dress with a deep V neck and double straps which opens high on the right thigh of the wearer. Defendant also manufactured and sold a full length dress with a deep V neck and double straps. However, Defendant’s dress does not have a slit, but a mermaid shape. However, Plaintiff also claims the two designs are “substantially similar, if not identical.”

Plaintiff is of course aware that a dress is a useful article and, as such, is not protected by copyright. In order to be able to claim copyright protection for Design A, Plaintiff argues that:

“[Design A] [w]ould qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works- either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression, despite having some utilitarian function, which is to facilitate conduct associated with the 70’s an area which Roy Halston Frowick is strongly identified [sic], and as described by Erica Jong as “the purest thing there is. And it is rarer than the unicorn.” Erica Jong, Fear of Flying (1973). See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands., 580 U.S.___, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).”

The Supreme Court held that In Star Athletica that a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article can be protected by copyright if (1) it can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article, and (2) if it would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression, if it were imagined separately from the useful article.

The feature incorporated in the design of the useful dress is “an overlay to express movement, affixing fabric in a manner to affect the appearance, weight and asymmetrical flow of the design, including but not limited to incorporation of a gusset and tack in the flounce, and increasing the downward visual consistency and depth of the two colors used.”

Plaintiff seems to argue that the function of this feature, which can be protected as a work of art, is “to facilitate conduct associated with the 70’s an area which Roy Halston Frowick is strongly identified [sic], and as described by Erica Jong as “the purest thing there is. And it is rarer than the unicorn.”
I was puzzled by the Erica Jong reference and wondered if Erica Jong was referring in this quote to the 70’s or to Halston. Actually, she was referring to …well… Here is the quote: “The zipless fuck is the purest thing there is. And it is rarer than the unicorn.” I was still puzzled after finding the quote and I am looking forward to reading Defendant’s motion or answer to the complaint to find out what its attorneys made out of it.

Excluding Designs (and Shape Marks) - Where is the CJEU going?

Professor Uma Suthersanen (Queen Mary University of London) is giving a lecture at the City Law School on the 27th November, exploring the EU's design right jurisprudence

"The EU design regime adopted a new “market-based approach”, which protects both functional and aesthetic designs. Nevertheless, it is recognised that certain types of functional designs can give rise to unduly restrictive effects on legitimate competition, within certain product sectors. Accordingly, Art.8(1) Community Design Regulation expressly excludes "features of appearance of a product which are solely dictated by its technical function”; the paramount rationale being the protection of competitive innovation. The past decade has spawned three separate interpretations of the functionality exclusion, the most paradoxical being the linkage drawn between aesthetic considerations and functional presence. A further layer of analysis derives from the functionality exclusion within the Community Trademark Regulation. A final challenge to juridical coherence is the EU Court’s earlier Flos decision widening national copyright law to embrace all sorts of designs, and presumably functional designs. It is submitted that the CJEU's decision in Doceram (2018) is perhaps the right approach - whereby it rejects all three previous interpretations, but weaves one which marries them all. The approach is also logical if one accepts that the functionality exclusions within design, trade mark and copyright laws must be interpreted in pari materia within an increasingly-aligned EU IP law"

This is free, but you need tor register and you can SIGN UP HERE 

27th November 2018 at 15.00

City, University of London
Northampton Square


Wednesday, 24 October 2018

EFF calls for reforms - to the reforms !

As the CopyKat reported earlier this week, the technology sectors are continuing their assault on planned reforms to EU Copyright law, and now the Electronic Frontiers Foundation has joined the likes of Google, YouTube and Facebook in criticising the planned copyright law reforms. In a letter the EFF say has been sent to everyone involved in the upcoming "Trilogues", the meetings held between representatives from European national governments, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, Cory Doctorow argues that the reforms contained in Articles 11 and 13 of the Copyright Directive are "ill considered and have no place in the Directive", concluding that instead of effecting some "piecemeal fixes to the most glaring problems", the Trilogue takes a simpler approach, and removes them from the Directive altogether. 

Having previously opined that the vote in the European Parliament that passed the draft Directive "brought the EU much closer to a system of universal mass censorship and surveillance, in the name of defending copyright" and that Articles 13 and 11 would create "upload filters" and the “link tax”, the EFF's views are perhaps unsurprising - you can make of the points raised as you will, as the letter is set out in full is below:

The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development. We work to ensure that rights and freedoms are enhanced and protected as our use of technology grows. We are supported by over 37,000 donating members around the world, including around three thousand within the European Union.

We believe that Articles 11 and 13 are ill-considered and should not be EU law, but even stipulating that systems like the ones contemplated by Articles 11 and 13 are desirable, the proposed text of the articles in both the Parliament and Council texts contain significant deficiencies that will subvert their stated purpose while endangering the fundamental human rights of Europeans to free expression, due process, and privacy.

It is our hope that the detailed enumeration of these flaws, below, will cause you to reconsider Articles 11 and 13's inclusion in the Directive altogether, but even in the unfortunate event that Articles 11 and 13 appear in the final language that is presented to the Plenary, we hope that you will take steps to mitigate these risks, which will substantially affect the transposition of the Directive in member states, and its resilience to challenges in the European courts .

Article 13: False copyright claims proliferate in the absence of clear evidentiary standards or consequences for inaccurate claims.

Based on EFF’s decades-long experience with notice-and-takedown regimes in the United States, and private copyright filters such as YouTube's ContentID, we know that the low evidentiary standards required for copyright complaints, coupled with the lack of consequences for false copyright claims, are a form of moral hazard that results in illegitimate acts of censorship from both knowing and inadvertent false copyright claims.

For example, rightsholders with access to YouTube's ContentID system systematically overclaim copyrights that they do not own. For instance, the workflow of news broadcasters will often include the automatic upload of each night's newscast to copyright filters without any human oversight, despite the fact that newscasts often include audiovisual materials whose copyrights do not belong to the broadcaster – public domain footage, material used under a limitation or exception to copyright, or material that is licensed from third parties. This carelessness has predictable consequences: others — including bona fide rightsholders — who are entitled to upload the materials claimed by the newscasters are blocked by YouTube and have a copyright strike recorded against them by the system, and can face removal of all of their materials. To pick one example, NASA's own Mars lander footage was broadcast by newscasters who carelessly claimed copyright on the video by dint of having included NASA's livestream in their newscasts which were then added to the ContentID database of copyrighted works. When NASA itself subsequently tried to upload its footage, YouTube blocked the upload and recorded a strike against NASA.

In other instances, rightsholders neglect the limitations and exceptions to copyright when seeking to remove content. For example, Universal Music Group insisted on removing a video uploaded by one of our clients, Stephanie Lenz, which featured incidental audio of a Prince song in the background. Even during the YouTube appeals process, UMG refused to acknowledge that Ms. Lenz’s incidental inclusion of the music was fair use – though this analysis was eventually confirmed by a US federal judge. Lenz's case took more than ten years to adjudicate, largely due to Universal's intransigence, and elements of the case still linger in the courts.

Finally, the low evidentiary standards for takedown and the lack of penalties for abuse have given rise to utterly predictable abuses. False copyright claims have been used to suppress whistleblower memos detailing flaws in election security, evidence of police brutality, and disputes over scientific publication.

Article 13 contemplates that platforms will create systems to allow for thousands of copyright claims at once, by all comers, without penalty for errors or false claims. This is a recipe for mischief and must be addressed.

Article 13 Recommendations

To limit abuse, Article 13 must, at a minimum, require strong proof of identity from those who seek to add works to an online service provider's database of claimed copyrighted works and make ongoing access to Article 13's liability regime contingent on maintaining a clean record regarding false copyright claims.

Rightsholders who wish to make copyright claims to online service providers should have to meet a high identification bar that establishes who they are and where they or their agent for service can be reached. This information should be available to people whose works are removed so that they can seek legal redress if they believe they have been wronged.

In the event that rightsholders repeatedly make false copyright claims, online service providers should be permitted to strike them off of their list of trusted claimants, such that these rightsholders must fall back to seeking court orders – with their higher evidentiary standard – to effect removal of materials.

This would require that online service providers be immunised from Article 13's liability regime for claims from struck off claimants. A rightsholder who abuses the system should not expect to be able to invoke it later to have their rights policed. This striking-off should pierce the veil of third parties deputised to effect takedowns on behalf of rightsholders ("rights enforcement companies"), with both the third party and the rightsholder on whose behalf they act being excluded from Article 13's privileges in the event that they are found to repeatedly abuse the system. Otherwise, bad actors ("copyright trolls") could hop from one rights enforcement company to another, using them as shields for repeated acts of bad-faith censorship.

Online service providers should be able to pre-emptively strike off a rightsholder who has been found to be abusive of Article 13 by another provider.

Statistics about Article 13 takedowns should be a matter of public record: who claimed which copyrights, who was found to have falsely claimed copyright, and how many times each copyright claim was used to remove a work.

Article 11: Links are not defined with sufficient granularity, and should contain harmonised limitations and exceptions.

The existing Article 11 language does not define when quotation amounts to a use that must be licensed, though proponents have argued that quoting more than a single word requires a license.

The final text must resolve that ambiguity by carving out a clear safe-harbor for users, and ensure that there’s a consistent set of Europe-wide exceptions and limitations to news media’s new pseudo-copyright that ensure they don’t overreach with their power.

Additionally, the text should safeguard against dominant players (Google, Facebook, the news giants) creating licensing agreements that exclude everyone else.

News sites should be permitted to opt out of requiring a license for inbound links (so that other services could confidently link to them without fear of being sued), but these opt-outs must be all-or-nothing, applying to all services, so that the law doesn’t add to Google or Facebook's market power by allowing them to negotiate an exclusive exemption from the link tax, while smaller competitors are saddled with license fees.

As part of the current negotiations, the text must be clarified to establish a clear definition of "noncommercial, personal linking," clarifying whether making links in a personal capacity from a for-profit blogging or social media platform requires a license, and establishing that (for example) a personal blog with ads or affiliate links to recoup hosting costs is "noncommercial."

In closing, we would like to reiterate that the flaws enumerated above are merely those elements of Articles 11 and 13 that are incoherent or not fit for purpose. At root, however, Articles 11 and 13 are bad ideas that have no place in the Directive. Instead of effecting some piecemeal fixes to the most glaring problems in these Articles, the Trilogue take a simpler approach, and cut them from the Directive altogether.

Thank you,

Cory Doctorow
Special Consultant to the Electronic Frontier Foundation

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market  COM(2016)593

Tuesday, 23 October 2018


American Airlines has filed a legal action against the U.S. Copyright Office after it was denied the registration of American Airlines' logo.  American Airlines Group, Inc. merged with US Airways and introduced its new logo five years ago. The new logo features a diagonal blue and red line with a bird's head in the middle. The Fort Worth-based carrier applied to register the new logo, which it dubbed the Flight Symbol, in 2016. In a move that surprised American, the Copyright Office denied American's registration. At one point, the Copyright Office reportedly said about the logo: "While the bar for creativity is low, it does exist and the work cannot glide over even its low heights." American disagrees, arguing that its Flight Symbol "easily" meets the creativity threshold necessary to register for copyright protection. The airline said that in most cases the Copyright Office's decisions are consistent and well-reasoned - but filed the lawsuit as here the office’s refusal “arbitrary, capricious … and an abuse of discretion” More here

The Von Zobel family from Giebelstadt, C1770
The CJEU has backed the opinion of Advocate General, Maciej Szpunar in a German case that pitted a defendant (Michael Strotzer) who claimed he could not be liable for online infringement because he and his parents used the same internet connection, and the need to balance the (here) conflicting rights  of a right to family life against the right of a copyright owner to protect their rights. The conclusion?  The court have upheld the AG's opinion that  "The right to respect for family life, recognised in article seven of the Charter Of Fundamental Rights of the EU, cannot be interpreted in such a way as to deprive right holders of any real possibility of protecting their right to IP" and confirmed the AG's position that  Strotzer was "abusing the right to protection of family life by invoking that right, not in order to protect the members of his family against liability for the infringement of copyright with which they clearly have no connection, but solely in order to escape his own liability for that infringement" - whilst a fair balance has to be to be struck, an individual's right to a private and family life doesn't trump the right of a copyright owner who is seeking an effective remedy for an infringement.

For an opinionated but highly readable critique of the proposed reforms to South Africa's intellectual property laws - look not further that Sadulla Karjiker's article Shambolic Copyright Amendment Bill will favour Google and its ilk in Business Day:  "There is no point in mincing my words about the passage of the proposed Copyright Amendment Bill thus far: it has been shambolic and would embarrass a banana republic. The reason the portfolio committee arrogated to itself the responsibility of drafting the bill was because the draft bill produced by the department was so poorly drafted that it resulted in wide-ranging criticisms from various stakeholders. Well, the portfolio committee’s efforts have quite frankly not been much better. Not only has the technical drafting been poor, but the department, and now the portfolio committee, continue to try to railroad a particularly skewed agenda through parliament." There is more - and it's all here.

And more of the same - or similar:  The American Law Institute describes itself as the “leading independent organisation in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernise and improve the law” and periodically the ALI issues what have generally been regarded as well reasoned, well researched and academically sound ‘Restatements Of The Law’. But now the record music and music publishing sectors in the USA have taken great exception to the ALI's latest Restatement, on copyright, claiming that far from being independent lawyers and academics - they are comprised of those who have pushed to restrict copyright, with one comment being the authors are "notoriously anti-creator copyleft irritators". The Recording Industry Association of America and the National Music Publishers Association have written a joint letter to the ALI, and NMPA boss David Israelite said a statement yesterday. “The American Law Institute’s so-called ‘Restatement Of Copyright Law ... was written by extremist anti-copyright lawyers in an attempt to redefine copyright law” - with the letter saying "in recent years copyright law for music has faced repeated tests and challenges, including for those who legislate and interpret the law, in large part due to the transformation of the music industry from physical to digital” and  “Important copyright law issues for music are before Congress, the courts and agencies”, they add. “Under these circumstances, attempting to ‘restate’ copyright law for music now is a difficult, if not an odd, exercise” and that  “copyright law is ill suited for restatement by ALI at this time, especially as envisioned by the [authors]".

And finally, an interesting read on copyright law reform in the Financial Times and the positive and negative sides of YouTube - with a quote from our very own John Enser! 

Money for nothing: copyright law, YouTube, and the future of music [Part II]

More here Money for nothing: copyright law, YouTube, and the future of music [Part II]. And YouTube certainly hasn't given up on trying to get rid of Article 13, with YouTube CEO Susan Wojcicki warning video makers about the "threat" of Article 13 in a blog post, urging them to "take action immediately" and protest the ruling with videos and social media posts - more here

Tuesday, 16 October 2018

Is Richard Prince in a Jam?

We have often written on this blog about the appropriation artist Richard Prince, whose work was at the origin of several copyright infringement cases, including the Cariou v. Prince case (see here, here, here, and here). Copyright bloggers owe him a full bowl of da la jam gratitude. 
Prince is still embroiled in two copyright infringement suits following his New Portraits 2014 exhibition at Gagosian : a copyright infringement suit was filed by photographer Donald Graham (see here) and another by photographer Eric McNatt (see here), both in the Southern District of New York (SDNY). These two cases are Eric McNatt v. Richard Prince et al., 1:16-cv-08896 and Graham v. Prince et al., 1:15-cv-10160. Richard Prince filed last week his two memorandums of law in support of his motions for summary judgment in these two cases, see here and here.

Richard Prince is an appropriation artist. He explained in his motion to dismiss the McNatt case that the New Portraits “continue Prince over 40-year career of using found photos and objects in order to comment on society, through the use of text and recontextualisation.” The New Portraits, reproductions of Instagram posts complete with a Prince’s comment, are each approximatively 41 by 41 inches, as an homage to Andy Warhol who used this format for his portraits, as explained in the McNatt memo.

In the McNatt case, Prince used a photograph of Kim Gordon, taken by Eric McNatt, and which has been published on social media, to create one of his New Portraits works. In the Graham case, Prince used Graham’s photograph of a Rastafarian smoking a jointwhich already existed pervasively on the Internet, largely through Donald Graham’s own actions” according to Prince’s memorandum, to create Portrait of Rastajay92. This is a rather odd argument, as Graham, as the copyright holder, has the exclusive right to publish his work as he wished to do, including on the web. This action does not give carte blanche to third parties to copy and use the work without permission.

Did Donald Graham grant an implied license?

Prince argued that Donald Graham had published his work on his Facebook page on a public setting, thus granting Facebook a non-exclusive, transferable license to use the photograph. Prince also argued that Graham did not use any embedded watermarks on his work, had not set any privacy settings for viewing the work, and that he understood that once published on the web, it was forever published on the web.  

Prince argued that he “reasonably interpreted Graham’s conduct as permission to use the [p]hotograph in a new way” and had a “non-exclusive implied license” to use the work, citing the Field v. Google case from the Nevada district court. In this case, the court had found that Google had an implied license to display works protected by copyright in cached links, even though the copyright owner did not explicitly authorize such use. However, the court noted that Field could have used a tag directing Google not to archive the pages, but did not do so and thus had implicitly given Google a license to display his works.

Prince claimed in the McNatt case memo that Eric McNatt and Kim Gordon had posted the original work on their Instagram accounts, and that McNatt still features the photograph on his website without embedded watermarks. The original Graham work had been republished on Instagram by a third party, user Rastajay92, and it is this social media post which was reproduced by Prince, complete with his own comment: “Canal Zinian da lam jam,” an allusion to his Canal Zone show, or, as Prince puts it, a “self-referential allusio[n] to his own artistic biography.” I wrote “da lam jam” on the Google translate box: it detected Arabic as a language, and offered “it did not g” as a translation. Curiouser and curiouser!

Prince’s memorandum in the Graham case argues that his New Portraits exhibition was a “social commentary” and thus a “core fair use principle… expressed through a novel technological and sociological medium and context” and that the forfeiture of the works, as asked by Plaintiff Donald Graham, “would have a chilling effect on the progress of the arts, to the detriment of the public.”

An ode to social media

Prince argued that his use of Graham’s work was highly transformative, because he used what he described as “an austere description of a Rastafarian” and turned it into “an ode to social media.” Prince further argued that the fact that he did not add anything to the original work, unlike in his works in the Cariou case, enhances his fair use claim, not weakens it, because he needed to “authentically replicate in the physical world the virtual world of social media.

He used similar arguments in his motion to dismiss the McNatt case, that he “imbued what was once an austere depiction, documenting a female rocker in a defiant pose into part of an ode to social media.

It may be an ode to social media, but it is also copyright infringement. The defense is fair use.

Is this ode to social media fair use?

Prince argued that his New Portraits were a parody of the social media posts as a whole. So it is an ode to social media which is also a parody. A parody is indeed highly transformative, and a highly transformative work is likely to be considered by courts as a fair use of a protected work, under the first fair use factor.

Prince argued that he used the Kim Gordon photograph to comment on social media, about “the whole idea of putting up images on a new platform that was available to anyone, to an entire population” and that artistic purpose was “a world-away from McNatt’s purpose in making the [p]hotograph.”

For Prince, Graham’s sales of his works have not suffered because of Prince’s use and Graham’s notoriety has even been greatly enhanced by Prince’s use, and that thus the fourth fair use factor, the effect on the market, should weigh in Prince’s favor.

Prince also argued that Graham did not have the right to exploit the photograph, as the right of publicity of its subject is governed by Jamaican law, and that therefore any harm done by Prince’s use of the work would harm an “illegitimate market.” Prince used a similar argument in his McNatt memo, arguing that the photographer did not obtain Kim Gordon’s written authorization to use her image, as required by the New York right of publicity statute, other than for their original use, a publication in Paper magazine.

Prince also argued that the second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, should be in his favor, as the original Graham work was “more factual than creative.” As for the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the work used, in relation to the protected work as a whole, Prince cited the Bill Graham case, in both of his memos, where the Second Circuit held that the third factor can weigh in favor of the defendant even if the work is reproduced in its entirety.

Prince argued that the original Graham work has been cropped and that the remaining work was necessary to serve Prince’s purpose, commenting about social media. He argued in the McNatt memo that Prince used an entire Instagram post, complete with “colorized emojis” and thus drew the viewer’s attention around the image, thus “reducing the artistic or intellectual importance of the photographic image relative to its physical portion of the painting.”

This is quite a fair use battle royal. Copyrights enthusiasts will keep watching, and possibly, cheering.

Image is courtesy of Flickr user (vincent desjardins) under a CC BY 2.0 license.