Showing posts with label freedom of expression. Show all posts
Showing posts with label freedom of expression. Show all posts

Thursday, 26 December 2019

Paris Court of Appeal confirms that Koons’s 'Naked' sculpture infringes copyright in 'Enfants' photograph, rejecting freedom of the arts and parody defences

Paris Court of Appeal confirms that Koons’s 'Naked' sculpture infringes copyright in 'Enfants' photograph, rejecting freedom of the arts and parody defences
By Eleonora Rosati writing for the IPKat and first published on the IPKat here 
Last week, the Paris Court Appeal ruled (decision No 152/2019) in favour of the estate of late French photographer Jean-François Bauret in proceedings brought against, inter alia, US artist Jeff Koons (an artist who, as readers will know, has been sued a few times for copyright infringement: see, eg, here, here, and here). 
The action related to the unauthorized reproduction of a photograph (Bauret’s ‘Enfants’, shown below on the left hand side) in a sculpture (Koons's ‘Naked’, below on the right hand side). 
'Enfants' (L) and 'Naked' (R)
The defendants had advanced a number of arguments, including that: 
- ‘Enfants’ is not original; 
- even if it was, ‘Naked’, would not incorporate any original elements thereof; 
- even if prima facie infringement was established, freedom of the arts and parody would prevail over copyright.
The court rejected them all. Let’s see what happened in greater detail. 
Background 
In 1970, Bauret realized a black-and-white photograph titled ‘Enfants’. No print of the photograph was sold, but in 1975 the photographer authorized the making of postcards carrying the image of the work. 
In 2014, the Bauret estate found out that Jeff Koons had realized a porcelain sculpture, ‘Naked’, which was similar to the ‘Enfants’ photograph. Koons’s work had been made in 1988 in 4 copies as part of the Banality series, a readymade collection of artworks that contains a mix of pop art and kitsch. 
The sculpture was never exhibited in France, though in 2015 it should have been on display in an exhibition at the Centre Pompidou in Paris. 
The Bauret estate sent a warning letter to both Koons and the museum. For reasons linked to damage during transportation, ‘Naked’ was not included in the exhibition in the end. The museum subsequently also removed the image of the sculpture from the exhibition catalogue. 
A lawsuit followed and, in 2017, the TGI Paris partly ruled in favour of the photographer’s estate. Both parties appealed. 
Aside from issues concerning the personal liability of Koons, the judgment is particularly interesting as far as substantive issues of copyright subsistence and infringement are concerned. 
Originality of ‘Enfants’
As regards the protectability of the photograph, the defendants had submitted that Bauret had failed to express his own personal touch. The choices made were not sufficient for the work to be considered his own intellectual creation, in that the photograph represented a ‘spontaneous pose’ assumed by the two children and the estate had failed to demonstrated where the originality of such creation would lie. 
The court disagreed, and held that Bauret’s work revealed a new concept of nude, which is raw and devoid of any sexual connotation, and such as to disclose the personality of the author. Among other things, the particular use of the light was meant to confer some ‘sculptural’ character to the photograph and the overall composition (including the pose and expression of the children) served to add a ‘geometric’ dimension to the work. According to the court, the latter in particular served to dispel any idea that the pose of the children would be spontaneous: rather, they had been directed by the photographer to assume a certain pose and expression. 
In light of all this, like at first instance, the photograph was found to be original and protectable. 
Prima facie infringement
The claimants pointed to the several similarities between the photograph and challenged the relevance of the argument, made by the defendants, that the different character (real vs fictional) and message (children’s innocence vs Adam & Eve) conveyed by, respectively, the photograph and the sculpture would exclude the recognizability of the former in the latter (it should be noted, however, that Koons never denied that he had had access to the photograph). 
The defendants submitted that the sculpture had not reproduced anything that would confer originality to the photograph, and highlighted the differences between these two, including the colour, dimensions (a 2D photo vs a 3D sculpture) and size ('Naked''s height is 1m), as well as other differences (hair colour, navel, children’s gaze, position of the hands, background, elements in the composition). 
The court disagreed, and found that the sculpture had actually incorporated the “essential features” of the photograph, which constituted its original character. 

Defences 
Copyright and freedom of expression 
The court also considered an important point: to what extent can freedom of expression – including freedom of artistic expression – restrict or even trump copyright protection? 
To answer this, the court followed a similar approach to the one indicated (correctly) by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its recent Grand Chamber rulings in Funke Medien, Spiegel Online, and Pelham [Katposts here, here,  and here] notably that only available copyright exceptions and limitations can be relied upon in an infringement action, and that it is not possible to invoke directly fundamental rights and freedoms or a ‘fair use’ of a work to trump the application of copyright's exclusive rights
In this sense, like the CJEU, the Paris court confirmed that the balance between different rights and freedoms is internal to the copyright system, and has been undertaken by legislature when envisaging available copyright exceptions and limitations. 
In all this, the court also considered that the unlicensed use of the photograph by Koons was not “necessary” for the exercise of his own freedom of expression. 
Parody 
The defendant had also raised an argument that the use at issue could qualify as parody. The court referred to the 2014 CJEU Deckmyn decision [Katposts here] and the requirements that, for a work to be considered a parody, first, it must evoke an existing work while being noticeably different from it and, second, it must constitute an expression of humour or mockery. 
The court considered that neither requirement would be fulfilled in the case at issue. 
'Chats', by Merpel
Comment 
The decision appears correct from a substantial standpoint and is also compliant with case law of the CJEU. The court correctly applied the Painer test (though it did not expressly refer to that decision) for determining originality of a photograph, by considering the ‘free and creative choices’ that the photographer had made in the pre-shooting phase, when taking the photograph, and in the post-production phase.
It also appropriately applied (again, without mentioning them expressly), the CJEU holdings in Funke Medien, Spiegel Online, and Pelham. 
In all this, the most interesting aspect of the decision probably relates to the application of the CJEU Deckmyn decision. As mentioned, one of the characteristics of a parody is that it must constitute an expression of humour or mockery. The CJEU did not clarify whether this requirement is fulfilled when an alleged parody pursues a humorous intent, or whether it is also required that it achieves it (as the Advocate General had suggested in his Opinion). 
If the test was ‘intent’, then the exception under Article 5(3)(k) of the InfoSoc Directive would be broader than if a humorous ‘effect’ was also required. Above all, requiring just intent would be better compliant with the need to safeguard parody as a means to exercise freedom of expression. As I discus at greater length here, the difficulties that might arise should a humorous effect be required, lead to the conclusion the correct test under Deckmyn is that of a humorous ‘intent’. 
In its decision the Paris Court of Appeal suggested that both intent and effect might fall within the concept of ‘expression of humour or mockery’ when it stated that: “La parodie doit aussi présenter un caractère humoristique, faire oeuvre de raillerie ou provoquer le rire” (“The parody must also have a humorous character, make fun of or provoke laughter”). So, an acceptable parody might perhaps be both one that makes fun without necessarily provoking laughter and one that provokes laughter without necessarily making fun. This might be an interesting take worth elaborating further in future case law. In all this, however, neither was the case of ‘Naked’.
The IPKat thanked Stéphanie Legrand, who represented the Bauret estate in the proceedings, for kindly providing a copy of the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal

Friday, 25 April 2014

Fordham Report 2014: Fair Use and Freedom of Speech

As 1709 Blog readers who also follow the IPKat will surely know, the 22nd Fordham IP Conference is currently taking place in the heart of beautiful Manhattan [and 6th May is the day of my Post-Fordham Copyright Catch-Up, for which you may register here]. Yesterday I was in two panels discussing EU copyright developments and orphan works, respectively. While I will report on those panels very soon, here we go with a report from yesterday's last copyright session. This dealt with a very fashionable topic, this being the relationship between copyright and freedom of speech/expression.

Despite the title, this session was not completely US-focused, and indeed I very much enjoyed the talk by Hon Mr Justice Colin Birss (Chancery Division, High Court, London) on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of expression) and its potential role in expanding copyright exceptions in Europe.

The copyright engine
Moderated by Melissa Moriarty (VaynerMedia, New York), the session began with a presentation by Sean M O’Connor (University of Washington School of Law, Seattle), who highlighted how First Amendment's free speech values are part of the copyright engine, notably through fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy. After playing I Wanna be Sedated [was this some wishful thinking considering that it was the last session of the day?] by Ramones, he argued that well-established copyright/free speech balance should not be changed just because online content dissemination has made users' engagement [read: user generated content] with protected works so easy.

Hon Mr Justice Colin Birss spoke next. He recalled that, when he started practicing IP in 1990s, nobody spoke of human rights in relation to IP. Things have now changed, and human rights discourse has entered IP, in particular copyright. This is a piece of property [see also Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights], which is protected as a fundamental right in itself. So the question is how to best balance property (copyright) with freedom of expression values. It is the legislator's job to craft copyright exceptions to struck such a balance. However, some guidance may come from Article 10 itself, which sets a distinction between ideas (that should be protected within freedom of expression) and their expression (that fall within the scope of copyright). This means that under the Convention there is room for drafting broader copyright exceptions, certainly broader than what current UK copyright law allows. So, for instance, if you look at cases like those of search engines that provide snippets of texts, you may well argue that under current EU copyright this activity may be probably infringing. However, it may be argued that snippets merely provide information (not protectable expressions) and that under Article 10 they should be protected as an exercise of one's freedom of expression.

Pamela Samuelson (University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, Berkeley) spoke on the topic of appropriation and transformative use cases. She started by highlighting that 'transformative uses' may have three meanings under US law: (1) altering expression so as to convey new meaning; (2) productive uses, usually of literal copies; (3) uses for different purposes. She then considered the case of appropriation art and Cariou v Prince [here]. She concluded by mentioning that there is a number of cases (a notable example being Garcia v Google) in which copyright is used to achieve non-copyright goals. Answering a question from the audience, she noted that the outcome of the Google Books case [here] is consistent with US case law on fair use.

Fair use countries (green);
fair dealing countries (blue);
other countries (grey)
Then Bernt Hugenholtz (Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam) spoke of the need for flexible limitations and exceptions in the EU. The principal question of his talk was whether droit d'auteur (continental Europe) traditions can accommodate fair use. He answered in the affirmative, and highlighted why more flexibility is needed. The reason is three-fold: (1) accelerating pace of technological change; (2) legislature cannot respond, but must anticipate change by embracing more abstract, open norms; (3) EU harmonisation is a lengthy process. After recalling why droit d'auteur traditions have been traditionally wary of fair use, he explained why things have somehow changed: (1) civil law has moved to more open norms; (2) authors right systems have been moving away from natural law arguments to justify copyright protection; (3) fair use is not unpredictable [but it is not so widespread either: see map]; (4) fair use does not conflict with the Berne three-step test. He concluded by recalling that Article 5(5) of the Wittem Group's Copyright Code may be a good start for injecting flexibility into the law.  

Ron Lazebnik (Fordham University School of Law, New York) was the final speaker, and he addressed the question 'Who decides what a fair use is on the Internet?' by looking into Capitol Records v Vimeo and Viacom v YouTube

Monday, 14 May 2012

Pirate Bay now sailing to the ECHR harbour

The Pirate Bay saga seems indeed destined to never end.
Earlier this year, Sweden's Supreme Court refused to hear Pirate Bay's final appeal and two of the founders and the funder of the (in)famous website were found guilty of copyright infringement (see Ben's post here). Parallel actions for copyright infringement brought in The Netherlands and the UK also ended up pretty badly for The Pirate Bay (see here, here and here).
Those more prone to discouragement might have thought that this series of adverse outcomes put the word "the end" to the business of Pirate Bay. But, apparently, the last word has not yet been said.
An enthusiastic Pirate Bay user
portrayed while exerting his
freedom of expression
As reported by TorrentFreak, today the lawyer of one of the founders of the website, Fredrik Neij, announced that he will now bring Neij’s case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Neij is now the only one whose fate is still unclear, as his fellow defendants in the litigation before Swedish courts have either settled or plead for clemency. The statement released by Neij's lawyer reads as follows (translation provided by TorrentFreak):
According to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees citizens of Sweden the freedom to receive and impart information, we believe that Frederick Neij’s right to freedom of expression has been denied him ... According to our complaint to the European Court, The Pirate Bay’s services – to transfer non-proprietary information among users through an automated process on the Internet – is protected under that article of the Convention.”
On this reading, The Pirate Bay is said to have never directly transferred or transmitted copyright-protected contents, as this was the sole responsibility of the site’s users. Indeed, the actual function of the website was “to allow the free dissemination of information via non-copyrighted torrent files.”

Desperate attempt of a lawyer to save his client -- or food for thought re the future of P2P file-sharing?

Thursday, 6 August 2009

Free speech or taking the Mikko? ECHR to decide

Here, via EDRI, is a curious episode. Finnish activist Mikko Rauhala has lodged an application to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that the Finnish state has infringed his right to freedom of expression. This application follows a long bout of litigation that began when Rauhala started a discussion board on the internet for people to talk about the DVD copy protection method Content Scrambling System (CSS). Why did he do this? He says his motivation was to criticize the implementation of the EU Copyright Directive, which came into force in Finland in 2006. According to the implementation of the directive [says the report on EDRI -- you won't find this explicitly in the Directive], "organized discussion" regarding circumventing technological protection measures, like the CSS, was prohibited. Since Rauhala's motivation was reputedly to demonstrate the non-beneficial nature of the directive, he himself reported his actions to the Finnish police, "thinking that the police would not investigate the issue or that the public prosecutor would not press charges".

Supported by the Finnish Anti-Piracy Association, the public prosecutor was soon in action. The Helsinki District Court decided in Rauhala's favour, holding that CSS was not a type of protection measure covered by the Directive and that the ban did not therefore apply. The district attorney appealed to the Helsinki Appellate Court, which found Rauhala guilty of illegally circumventing a technological protection measure (Directive, Art.6) and of providing an illegal service for the circumvention of protection measures. The Supreme Court of Finland agreed.

Now Rauhala's case is on its to the European Court of Human Rights, for a ruling on whether this decision compromises his freedom of expression. He maintains that the discussion he was administering was within the confines of that right as enshrined in the Finnish Constitution, but that this issue was not recognised.

Thursday, 7 May 2009

Technological accommodation of conflicts between freedom of expression and DRM

News from CIPIL, the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law at Cambridge University: Dr Patricia Akester has been busy. According to CIPIL's website,
"Technological accommodation of conflicts between freedom of expression and DRM: the first empirical assessment
Patricia Akester (PhD) was awarded a Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellowship (in association with matched funding from Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge) to undertake a project looking at the impact of technological measures on the ability of users to take advantage of the statutory exceptions to copyright. When technological measures were under consideration in the mid 1990s two stark scenarios presented themselves: on the one hand, an ideal world where copyright owners could use DRM to make their works available under a host of different conditions in a way that responded to the diversity of consumer demand; on the other, a more bleak environment where all users of copyright material (and much non-copyright material) would be forced to obtain permission and pay to access material that previously would have been available to all. In the face of these two extreme visions, the European legislature developed a compromise position, embodied notoriously in Article 6(4) of the Information Society Directive. The legislature appeared to be hoping that rightholders would voluntarily make material within certain specified exceptions available to users. Patricia Akester examines how these issues are working out in practice. Based on a series of interviews with key organisations and individuals, involved in the use of copyright material and the development and deployment of DRM, she provides a sober assessment of the current state of affairs. Her report is now available here".
So if you're looking for some reading material you can really get your teeth into, you'll know where to find it.  It's 208 pages long.