Britt Dekker for Playboy |
The 1709 Blog is delighted to host a guest contribution by Kristof Neefs (Altius)
on a specific point of the judgment, ie the profit-making nature of the
communication at hand.
Here's what Kristof writes:
"In GS Media (C-160/15), the EU Court
of Justice held that hyperlinking to content placed online elsewhere is a
communication to the public of that content if the hyperlinker had (or should
have had) knowledge that the content was posted online without the consent of
the copyright holder (§49).
In my opinion – and I believe this is uncontroversial – Directive 2001/29 provides no verbatim basis
for this subjective criterion. It is therefore up for debate whether it was
within the Court’s discretion to introduce this subjective criterion in the EU
copyright acquis. In the United States, the late Justice
Scalia would probably have said no. A legalist tradition opposes judicial
law-making. In contrast, judge Posner argues for pragmatism in How Judges Think (2008). This
leaves more room for a law-making court. In any case, the judgment is out and
it is what it is.
According to the judgment, the Court had freedom of expression and
information in mind with its ruling (§31). By requiring knowledge of the
illegal nature of the content referred to, internet users linking to it in good
faith are meant to be protected. To balance things out, however, the Court also
held in §51 that knowledge that the content the link refers to is illegal must
be presumed iuris tantum (i.e. until rebutted) if the posting
of hyperlinks “is carried out for profit”:
“Furthermore, when
the posting of hyperlinks is carried out for profit, it can be expected that
the person who posted such a link carries out the necessary checks to ensure
that the work concerned is not illegally published on the website to which
those hyperlinks lead, so that it must be presumed that that posting has
occurred with the full knowledge of the protected nature of that work and the
possible lack of consent to publication on the internet by the copyright
holder. In such circumstances, and in so far as that rebuttable presumption is
not rebutted, the act of posting a hyperlink to a work which was illegally
placed on the internet constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ within the
meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.”
This presumption provides copyright holders with the benefit of doubt
when the hyperlink is posted for financial gain. In those cases, it will be up
to the hyperlinker to provide evidence that he or she did not know (or should
have known) that the content was initially posted online without the consent of
the copyright holder.
The Court has, however, not elaborated on the criterion of profit and
financial gain. In particular, it does not seem to consider online advertising.
A great deal of blogs and websites feature per-click or per-impression advertisements
to ‘monetize’ content on their blog or website. Monetize is a big word here,
because in reality the income generated by these ads is just enough to cover
the costs of running the blog. Do such advertisements then automatically imply
that any hyperlink on the website is posted for financial gain?
I predict that this is an argument that may be run by some copyright
holders, because it relieves them of the burden of proof. Some EU courts may
accept this argument, especially if those copyright holders are clever in the
selection of cases they will initially pursue. I also predict that the blogger
who uses web advertising to finance the costs to keep a blog online (and even
those that make a small profit out of it) may not have the means to escalate
his or her case to the Court of Justice to obtain clarity over the criterion of
“financial gain” in GS Media. That is, unless a web advertisement
service operator with deep pockets would decide to lend a helping hand.
In GS Media, the Court has provided us with the means
to create flowcharts or tables to determine whether a hyperlink is a copyright infringement.
However, it seems that the Court has provided an answer that raises a new
question: what is the meaning of the “pursuit of financial gain” in
the internet context? Perhaps the phrase “commercial activity with a view to
economic advantage and not as a private matter” from the Court’s
judgment in Arsenal / Reed (C-206/01, §40), a trade mark case,
could be helpful. Another, somewhat more vague means of
interpretation could be the Recital 14 in the preamble to the Enforcement Directive 2004/48, defining acts
carried out on a commercial scale as those “carried out for direct
or indirect economic or commercial advantage; this would normally exclude acts
carried out by end consumers acting in good faith.”
If the “pursuit of financial gain” is interpreted more
broadly to cover all websites that somehow benefit financially
from online advertising, I believe the Court may have missed the mark in its
attempt to balance freedom of expression and the interests of copyright
holders."
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